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The German Air Transport Tax: 
A Treaty Override of International Law 
Uwe M. Erling*?
The German air transport tax significantly increases the ticket price of 
international and domestic flights from Germany.  The tax was introduced in 
2010 primarily to generate EUR 1 billion annually for the German general 
household.  However, the tax is an interesting example on how governments 
during the financial crisis used air transport as a cash generator while 
ignoring long-established principles of international law.  This article 
outlines and reviews the German air transport tax. 
Part A provides a nutshell overview of the key features of the tax.  Part 
B discusses why the tax is violating international (air transport) law, 
especially from the perspective of U.S. airlines.  Part C will briefly outline 
the consequences of this multiple-treaty override on the national level. 
A. THE GERMAN AIR TRANSPORT TAX
The German air transport tax, which was imposed beginning 
January 1, 2011,1 is in principle a departure tax on every departure of a 
passenger from a German airport at the following rates, whereby the 
rates were slightly reduced in 2012: 
Distance 2011 2012
1. Domestic flights and flights within the EU2 EUR 8.003 EUR 7.504
2. Medium-haul flights5 EUR 25.006 EUR 23.347
3. Long-haul flights, e.g., to the USA8 EUR 45.009 EUR 42.1810
?     LL.M., Tulane University; Rechsanwalt, Noer LLP, Brienner Straße 28, 80333 Munich, 
Germany; Telephone: +49 89 28 628 269; E-mail: uwe.erling@noerr.com. 
1  On October 28, 2010, the Luftverkehrsteuergesetz [LuftVStG] [Air Travel Tax Act 
(ATTA)] was passed as article 1 of the Haushaltsbegleitgesetz 2011 [HBeglG 2011] [Budget 
Accompanying Act 2011] by the German Federal Parliament.  The Act came into force on 
December 15, 2010. See BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] [Official Gazette] at 1885 (Ger.). 
2  LuftVStG, Dec. 14, 2010, BGBL I at 1888, art. 1, § 11, no. 1(1), annex 1 (Ger.) (third-party 
states with similar distances). 
3  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$8.93, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
4  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$8.37, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
5  LuftVStG, Dec. 14, 2010, BGBL I at 1888, art. 1, § 11, no. 1(2) (Ger.). 
6  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$27.91, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
7  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$26.05, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
8  LuftVStG, Dec. 14, 2010, BGBL I at 1888, art. 1, § 11, no. 1(3) (Ger.). 
9  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$50.23, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
10  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$47.09, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
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468 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:467 
The decisive objective of the German Air Transport Tax Act 
(ATTA) is primarily to generate cash for the German household.  
However, at the same time it aims to encourage environmentally-
friendly behavior by taxing air transport mobility.11  This objective is 
also directly linked to the objective to reduce the emissions of air 
transport.  Because under section 11 paragraph 2 of ATTA, the tax rate 
can be reduced by a certain percentage in relation to the respective 
receipts of the inclusion of air transport into the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme.12  Under this mechanism the tax rates were reduced in 2012. 
The explicit objective of the ATTA is to set incentives for 
environmentally-friendly conduct by taxing air transport.13  This 
objective is directly connected with the objective of reducing the 
emissions from air transport because, according to section 11 
subsection 2 of ATTA, the tax rates can be reduced by percentages 
depending on the income achieved from the inclusion of air transport in 
emissions trading.14  The intention inherent in the ATTA of reducing air 
traffic is also proved by the origins of the provisions.  The ATTA goes 
back to the Zukunftspaket (“package for the future”) of the Federal 
Government on consolidating the budget.  On June 7, 2010, the federal 
cabinet already adopted a paper on securing solid state financing with 
the title “Strengthening the Cornerstones of our Future—Our Eight-Point 
Plan to Assure Solid Finances, to Create Fresh Growth and Employment 
and to Prioritise Education.”15  This paper, which was the basis for the 
further drafting of the draft budget 2011 and the finance plan to 2014, 
also provided at that time for the introduction of an expressly described 
national ecological air transport tax. This intention is also reflected by 
the evaluation report on the air transport tax of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance in 2012.  The Federal Ministry of Finance emphasizes therein 
that when considering the environmental effects of the air transport tax 
protection of the climate is the primary focus.  The Ministry accordingly 
designed the graded tariff structure based on the averaged CO2 emissions 
per passenger.16
11 See Bundestagsdrucksache [BT-Drs.] [Government Explanatory Memorandum], 17/3030 at 23, 
36 (Ger.). 
12  LuftVStG, Dec. 14, 2010, BGBL I at 1888, art. 1, § 11, no. 2 (Ger.). 
13  BT-Drs., 17/3030 at 23, 36 (Ger.). 
14  LuftVStG, Dec. 14, 2010, BGBL I at 1888, art. 1, § 11, no. 2 (Ger.). 
15  Die Grundpfeiler unserer Zukunft stärken—Acht Punkte für solide Finanzen, neues Wachstum 
und Beschäftigung und Vorfahrt für Bildung [Strengthening the Cornerstones of our Future—Our Eight-
Point Plan to Assure Solid Finances, to Create Fresh Growth and Employment and to Prioritise 
Education], Ergebnispapier der Sparklausur der Bundesregierung [German Federal Government], June 
7, 2010 (Ger.). 
16 See BT-Drs., 17/10225 at 58, 61, chart 33 (Ger.). 
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According to expert opinion submitted in the legislative procedure, 
the ATTA should lead to a reduction in passenger numbers of at least 6 
to 7 million passengers.17  This prognosis has almost been fulfilled in 
2011.  According to a study of the effects of the air transport tax on 
traffic and the economy passenger reduction of at least 5 million.18
Originally the ATTA19 obliged all foreign airlines that do not have 
their registered offices in Germany to nominate a tax agent authorised 
in accordance with ATTA section 8.  With the 2012 amendment of the 
ATTA,20 the obligation to nominate a tax agent was repealed with effect 
on January 1, 2013, only for foreign airlines having their registered 
offices in a Member State of the European Union.  That means that all 
non-EU airlines at present must still nominate a tax agent.  An 
unreasonable burden results from this.  The tax agent is liable 
individually as well as jointly and severally with the relevant foreign 
airline.21  This means that the tax agent is obliged to bear a considerable 
risk of liability although he has no knowledge of the financial situation 
of the airline.  For this reason, only a few service providers are prepared 
to accept the task and function as tax agent.  If they do accept this 
function, they demand exorbitant security fees.  Service providers active 
on the market usually demand bank guarantees of two to three months 
air transport tax.  Therefore the duty to nominate a tax agent is a 
particular burdensome obligation for non-EU airlines operating flights 
from Germany in comparison to their EU competitors. 
 B. THE ATTA BREACHES INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Contrary to a recent judgment of the German Fiscal Court of Hesse, the 
ATTA breaches international (air transport) law in several respects.22  The 
ATTA at first breaches the German and American Friendship, Commerce 
17 See Hearing of the Budget Committee of the Federal Parliament, Oct. 4, 2010, protocol 
no. 17/30 at 43. 
18 See Intraplan, Untersuchung zur verkehrlichen und volkswirtschaftlichen Wirkung der 
Luftverkehrsteuer, April 19, 2012 at 27, titled “Verkehrsverluste von mindestens 5 Mio. 
Passagieren” [Passenger Reduction of at least 5 Million]. 
19 See ATTA, Dec. 9, 2011, BGBL I at 1855, art. 1, § 7(2), sentence 3 (Ger.). 
20 See Gesetz zur Änderung des Energiesteuer- und des Stromsteuergesetzes sowie zur Änderung 
des Luftverkehrsteuergesetzes [Energie/Strom/LuftVStGÄndG] [Act Amending the Energy Tax and 
Electricity Tax Act and Amending the ATTA], Dec. 5, 2012, BGBL I at 2436 (Ger.). 
21 ATTA, BGBL I § 6(1) (Ger.).
22 See Hessisches Finanzgericht, 3 June 2015, 7 K 631/12, available at https://fg-kassel-
justiz.hessen.de/irj/FG_Kassel_Internet?rid=HMdJ_15/FG_Kassel_Internet/sub/4c4/4c460e4a-a021-bf4 
1-79cd-aa2b417c0cf4,,,11111111-2222-3333-4444-100000005003%26overview=true.htm. 
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and Navigation Treaty of October 29, 1954 (TFCN).23  Further, there is a 
breach of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of December 7, 
1944 (Chicago Convention).24  In addition, there is also a breach of the 
trilateral Air Transport Agreement between the European Union, their 
Member States and the United States of July 25, 2007. 
I.  German and American Treaty on Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 
The ATTA breaches article XI of the TFCN of October 29, 1954, 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of 
America in two respects.  Firstly, the classification of the tax rates 
breaches the principle of most favoured status of article XI, section 3 of 
the TFCN,25 secondly, the obligation to nominate a tax agent imposed 
on U.S. airlines breaches article XI, sections 1 and 3 of the TFCN.26
1.  Classification of the ATTA tax rates 
The air transport tax breaches article XI, section 3 of the TFCN of 
October 29, 1954, between Germany and the USA, which was signed 
and ratified by Germany.27  The introduction of the air transport tax leads 
to more intensive burdens of American airlines compared to the airlines 
of third countries under similar conditions and therefore breaches the 
most favored clause of article XI of the TFCN: 
Nationals and companies of either Party shall in no case be subject, 
within the territories of the other Party, to the payment of taxes, fees or 
charges imposed upon or applied to income, capital, transactions, 
activities or any other object, or to requirements with respect to the levy 
and collection thereof, more burdensome than those borne in like 
situations by nationals, residents and companies of any third country. 
Article XI, section 3 of the TFCN enshrines a most favoured 
principle, according to which, under similar conditions, no company of 
a contracting party may be treated for tax purposes less favorably than 
a company of a third country.  Tax relief therefore also must benefit all 
contracting parties.  The principle, therefore, prevents unfavourable 
treatment of the contracting party in comparison to other trading partners 
and therefore trading and tax reliefs in similar situations must be 
guaranteed to all equally. 
23  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Germany-U.S., Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839. 
24    Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944-Feb. 28, 1945, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
25 See infra section 1. 
26 See infra section 2. 
27 Cf. Act of May 7, 1956, BGBL. II at 487 (Ger.). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 62 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 62 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
08 - ERLING_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 6:30 PM
2015] The German Air Transport Tax 471 
This most favoured principle continues to apply because the EU/
U.S. Open Skies Agreement (Open Skies Agreement) contains no most 
favored clause and is restricted to regulating competition on the 
transatlantic market and/or the air transport between the EU and the U.S. 
By the air transport tax U.S. carriers are obliged to pay taxes.  The 
air transport tax, thereby facilitates, because of the setting of tax rates 
according to section 11, subsection 1 of the ATTA and annexes 1 and 2 
of the ATTA, a more onerous burden on the airlines of the United States 
of America than under similar conditions on the companies of third 
countries outside the European Union according to annexes 1 and 2 of 
the ATTA. 
For example, the ATTA places a greater burden on U.S. airlines for 
flights from Germany to the U.S., which are taxed in principle at 
EUR 45.0028 (up from 2012 taxes at EUR 42.1829) per passenger, than 
on Russian airlines which are taxed for all flights from Germany to 
Russia only at EUR 8.0030 (up from EUR 7.5031 in 2012).  A 
considerably different taxation therefore applies, although the situation 
on the basis of which tax is imposed is often comparable in the case of 
flights to the USA and to Russia.  For example, the distance of flights 
of U.S. airlines from Frankfurt to New York at 3,860 miles and flights 
of a Russian airline from Frankfurt to Irkutsk at 3,850 miles or 
Vladivostok with 4,864 miles, is similar or takes even less time.  The 
subject matter of the tax and the circumstances of the tax are also 
similar—both with a flight to the U.S. and a flight to Russia the 
departure from Germany is the link.32  However, the flights are 
significantly differently taxed. 
The Fiscal Court of Hesse however, denied a violation of article XI 
by the classification of tax rates.33 It argues that no “like situations” 
exist. U.S. airlines operating only in the intercontinental traffic would 
offer service in a “different market” compared to Russian airlines 
operating primarily in the European traffic, i.e., flights to Moscow. 
Furthermore, the quantity of flights to eastern Russia could be 
considered as very low. But this interpretation is not convincing as it 
conflicts with the wording and purpose of article XI (“in no case”). 
By the more onerous burdening of U.S. airlines under similar 
conditions as Russian airlines, the ATTA therefore breaches the most-
28  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$50.23, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
29  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$47.09, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
30  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$8.93, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
31  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$8.37, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
32 See ATTA, § 1(1), § 2, no. 3, § 4 (Ger.). 
33 See Hessisches Finanzgericht, 3 June 2015, 7 K 631/12, p. 28. 
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favoured principle according to article 11, section 3 of the TFCN 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USA. 
2.  Obligation to Nominate a Tax Agent 
The obligation to nominate a tax agent according to section 7, 
subsection 2, sentence 3 and section 8 of the ATTA, which is only 
imposed on airlines that are not domiciled in Germany or another 
EU Member State, also constitutes an unjustified discrimination in the 
meaning of article XI, sections 1 and 3 of the TFCN.  The obligation to 
nominate a tax agent results for non-EU airlines in many respects in tax 
disadvantages and additional costs as already outlined above.34
The principle of equal treatment with nationals of the host state 
according to article XI, subsection 1 of the TFCN prohibits the 
imposition of additional burdens on companies of a contracting state 
with regard to tax relevant circumstances operating or doing business in 
the territory of the other contracting state (U.S. airlines doing business 
in Germany), in comparison to companies of the other contracting state 
(German airlines). 
According to the principle of most favored status of article XI, 
subsection 3 of the TFCN, companies of a contracting state may in no 
case be subject to greater tax burdens than companies of a third state.  
Taking into account effective equal treatment with nationals of the host 
state and the object and purpose of the principle of most favored status 
any less favorable taxation or less favorable fiscal treatment of a 
contracting partner is prohibited.35
For German, EU and airlines from the USA obviously the same 
conditions apply in relation to the transport of passengers from Germany 
to the USA (comparable subject matter of the tax, comparable 
circumstances of the tax, comparable distance).  The sole difference for 
the obligation to nominate a tax agent is, according to section 7 
subsection 2, sentence 3 of the ATTA, the domicile of the relevant 
airline.  Unequal treatment based on the registered office of a company 
on purely fiscal grounds is, according to the wording, object, and 
purpose of article XI of the TFCN however, obviously inadmissible. The 
unequal treatment cannot be justified by the different possibilities of 
exchanging information and recovering tax claims against U.S. airlines 
on the one hand and German/EU airlines on the other hand.36 Such an 
34 Id. at § A. 
35 See Bernütz/Loll, IStR 2012, 744, 745 (Ger.). 
36 Contra Hessisches Finanzgericht, 3 June 2015, 7 K 631/12, p. 40. 
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argument would ignore the wording and purpose of article XI.37
Ultimately, the principle of equal treatment with nationals of the 
host state according to article XI, subsection 1 of the TFCN is breached, 
therefore, by the obligation (existing since January 2011 according to 
section 7, subsection 2, sentence 3 of the original version of the ATTA, 
dated December 9, 2010) to nominate a tax agent for airlines that do not 
have their registered offices in Germany.  In addition from the time of 
the amendment of the ATTA entering into force on January 1, 2013 the 
obligation to nominate a tax agent for airlines without registered office 
in Germany or in other Member States of the EU also breaches the 
principle of most favored status of article XI, subsection 3 of the TFCN. 
II.  Violation of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention 
The Air Transportation Tax Act cannot be reconciled with article 15 of 
the Chicago Convention, the last sentence of the last paragraph of which 
under the heading “Airport and similar charges” states: 
No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State 
in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its 
territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property 
thereon.
Article 15 of the Chicago Convention forbids contracting states to 
impose financial burdens in the form of fees, dues or other charges solely 
with respect to the right of transit over or entry into or exit of an aircraft if 
these burdens are not cost-based, i.e., are not connected to availing of airport 
services or infrastructure. 
In addition, article 3, subsection 4, and article 15, subsection 3, of the 
EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement require that charges in connection with the 
implementation of environmental measures must be in accordance with 
article 15 of the Chicago Convention. 
In the present case, the airlines pay the tax solely to obtain the right to 
exit from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.38  In the opinion 
of the ICAO, article 15 prohibits charging fees for the departure or arrival of 
international flights unless the fees are cost based and serve the provision of 
installations or services of civil aviation. 
37  Furthermore a new OECD-Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in tax 
Maters entered into force in Germany in July 2015 and differences in enforcement do no longer 
exist. See Übereinkommen über die gegenseitige Amtshilfe in Steuersachen, 23 July 2015 (BGBl. 
II S. 966).
38  It is to be noted that German air transport tax affects approximately 269 foreign airlines.  This 
compares to only 165 German airlines. 
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According to the ICAO Council Resolution on Environment Charges 
and Taxes of December 9, 1996, on article 15 of the Chicago Convention, the 
imposition of environmental charges is admissible only if the proceeds are 
used in mitigation of the environmental effects of aircraft emissions and the 
charges are related to these mitigation costs.  The Air Transport Tax is not, 
however, apparently linked to any mitigation measures nor is the collected 
tax intended for financing a specific mitigation programme but benefits the 
general budget. 
The Fiscal Court Hesse however has rejected a violation of article 15 by 
simply stating that the tax is not collected for the right of exit as this right is 
granted irrespective of the tax.39 The judgment fails to explain in a convincing 
manner why an airline, that does not pay the tax and whose aircraft is 
therefore refused the right to departure by the German Aviation Authority 
shall still have an independent right of exit. The opposite is true. The right of 
departure is linked to the payment of taxes. The mere fact that it is not the 
Customs Office but the aviation authority refusing the right of departure does 
not justify a different legal assessment. 
The Air Transport Tax is therefore an ultimately inadmissible fee or an 
inadmissible other charge solely for the right to exit from German territory 
in the meaning of article 15, subsection 2, sentence 3 of the Chicago 
Convention. 
III.  Conflict With EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement 
Article 2, article 3, subsection 4, together with article 15, 
subsection 3 of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement, demand that 
charges in connection with the conduct of environmental measures must 
be reconcilable with article 15 of the Chicago Convention.  Precisely in 
relation to European-American air transport, it is thereby clarified that 
the purpose of article 15 of the Chicago Convention cannot be placed in 
question by environmental measures.  In fact, the reference to 
environmental protection as an objective of the Act does not provide any 
release from the provisions of the Chicago Convention.  The latter is 
breached, however, as has been shown above, by the fact that the air 
transport tax constitutes an inadmissible charge for departures from 
Germany.  A breach of article 15 of the Chicago Convention and 
article 3, subsection 4, together with article 15, subsection 3 of the EU/
U.S. Open Skies Agreement is therefore established. 
39 See Hessisches Finanzgericht, 3 June 2015, 7 K 631/12, p. 21. 
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IV.  Taxation Of Environmentally-Relevant Conduct Outside the Sovereign 
Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in Violation of the Air 
Sovereignty of Other States 
1.  Sovereignty Is a Central Principle in International Law 
The principle of sovereignty is a central principle in international 
law laid down in many international law treaties in the area of air 
transport and environment.  In detail, Article 1 of the Chicago 
Convention states: “The contracting States recognize that every State 
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory.”40
In chapter II of the Chicago Convention (“Flight over Territory of 
Contracting States”), article 11 states as follows under the heading 
“Applicability of Air Regulations”: 
Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the laws and regulations of 
a contracting State relating to the admission to or departure from its 
territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the 
operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall 
be applied to the aircraft of all contracting States without distinction as 
to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering 
or departing from or while within the territory of that State.41
In addition, article 12 of the Chicago Convention on the “Rules of 
the Air” restricts the right to issue regulations regarding flight and 
navigation of aircraft to each state’s own sovereign territory and restricts 
the application of the regulations over the high seas with the exception 
of the airlines of the country itself: 
Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to insure that every 
aircraft flying over or manoeuvring within its territory and that every 
aircraft carrying its nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, 
shall comply with the rules and regulations relating to the flight and 
manoeuvre of aircraft there in force.  Each contracting State undertakes 
to keep its own regulations in these respects uniform, to the greatest 
possible extent, with those established from time to time under this 
Convention.  Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be those 
established under this Convention. Each contracting State undertakes 
to insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations 
applicable.42
40     Chicago Convention, Article 1 (emphasis added). 
41     Chicago Convention, Chapter II, Article 11. 
42     Chicago Convention, Article 12. 
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 The EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement, in article 7, specifies that the 
contracting states have agreed to restrict the application of their own 
laws and regulations on international air transport geographically.43
2.  Substantial Content of the Principle of Sovereignty under 
International Law 
The principle of sovereignty under international law covers several 
aspects in the substantial content, which will be discussed in more detail 
below.
a)  Principle of Sovereignty over the Airspace 
The sovereignty over the airspace guaranteed by article 1 of the 
Chicago Convention corresponds to the territorial control that the State 
has on its own territory.44
The territorial sovereignty grants the State the exclusive right to 
adopt acts over its own territory.45
At the same time, the territorial sovereignty defines and limits the 
governmental power.  It is generally accepted that, because of the 
territorial exclusivity, a State may only adopt sovereign acts relating to 
its own territory.  The enactment of extra-territorial legal acts is, 
therefore, generally inadmissible without the approval of other states 
affected thereof.46
b)  No Competence for Unilateral Exterritorial Action According to 
International Air and Environmental Law 
The architecture of international air law is based on bilateral air 
service agreements between sovereign states.  Any unilateral action of a 
single state interfering with the air space of other countries would be in 
43  Article 1, subsection 9 of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement defines the sovereign territory 
of the EU and the USA.  The wording of the provision is as follows: 
“The laws and regulations of a Party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft 
engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its 
territory, shall be applied to the aircraft utilized by the airlines of the other Party, and shall be complied 
with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of the first Party. 
While entering, within, or leaving the territory of one Party, the laws and regulations applicable within 
that territory relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo on 
aircraft (including regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs and quarantine 
or, in the case of mail, postal regulations) shall be complied with by, or on behalf of, such passengers, 
crew or cargo of the other Party’s airlines.” 
44 Cf. SCHWENK, GIEMULLA, HANDBUCH DES LUFTRECHTS 2012 (2005). 
45 Cf. HERDEGEN, VÖLKERRECHT, sec. 23, marginal number 2 (12th ed., 2013); ARNAULD,
VÖLKERRECHT, marginal number 334, 785 (2012). 
46 Cf. ARNAULD, VÖLKERRECHT, marginal number 642 (2012). 
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conflict with the principle of sovereignty. 
But also, in international environmental law, it has been long 
acknowledged that States must respect one another sovereignty.  This is 
convincingly proven by the principles of consideration and cooperation 
of the Stockholm declaration.47  These principles are confirmed and 
concretized by principles 2 and 12 of the Rio Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 
in June 1992.48
Moreover, the need of international co-operation is also emphasized 
in article 2, subsection 2 of the Kyoto Protocol with regard to the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  There it is stated: 
The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of 
emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol 
from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
47  Already the Stockholm declaration of the United Nations of the year 1972 stipulates 
the international principle of consideration and cooperation in principles 21 and 24: 
Principle 21: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
Environmental law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.   
Cf. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 1972, 1007, 1010. 
Principle 24: 
International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be 
handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries, big or small, on an equal footing.  Cooperation 
through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effectively 
control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities 
conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of 
all States.
See Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 1972, 1276, 1278.
48   Principle 2: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international 
law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.   
See Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 1992, 1276, 1278. 
Principle 12: 
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would 
lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems 
of environmental degradation.  Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction 
of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or 
global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.
Cf. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 1992, 1276, 1278 (emphasis added). 
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Maritime Organization, respectively.49
Hence, it is imperative under international environmental law that 
the common interest in protecting the environment as such does not 
justify the enactment of unilateral extra-territorial measures by 
individual States.  The importance of national sovereignty in the area of 
environment is, in fact, proven by the requirement to cooperate 
internationally.  Unilateral measures taken by states as a preferred 
solution to environmental problems that are imposed unilateral to other 
States will cause conflicts.  Such an approach clearly conflicts with the 
above outlined requirements of international environmental law. 
3.  The ATTA Breaches the Principle of Sovereignty 
The ATTA breaches the air sovereignty of other states guaranteed 
in the above mentioned provisions by using environmentally-relevant 
acts, which take place outside the sovereign territory of Germany as a 
basis for taxation.50  That is because the ATTA is designed as an 
ecological steering tax by which—apart from generating income for the 
federal budget—cross-border environmental effects of air transport shall 
decisively be taxed ecologically.  This is emphasised in the legislative 
material, which stresses that the objective of the tax is to set incentives 
for environmentally-friendly behaviour in air transport.51
The extraterritorial area of application of the air transport tax is 
shown already by the fact that with regard to the ecological steering 
effect of the ATTA, climate protection in air transport is the priority.  
The subject matter of the regulation is therefore emission, which is 
obviously not restricted to the sovereign territory of Germany.  The 
Federal Ministry of Finance itself emphasizes in its evaluation report on 
the air transport tax of June 29, 2012 that climate protection is in the 
foreground in the course of considering the qualitative environmental 
effects of the air transport tax.52  At the same time, the Federal Ministry 
of Finance emphasises in its evaluation report that the distance flown is 
49  Cf. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
of Dec. 11, 1997, BGBl. II at 966 (2002). 
50 Contra Hessisches Finanzgericht, 3 June 2015, 7 K 631/12, p. 14 (stating that a state has the 
right to subject to taxation even facts that are realized outside its territory as long as the linkage point for 
the tax does not create effects outside its own territory affecting the territorial sovereignty of another state).  
51 Cf. BT-Drs., 17/3030 at 23 (Ger.).  At another place, it is stated: “With the ATTA, air 
transport is intended to be included in the taxation of mobility to provide incentives for 
environmentally-appropriate conduct.  With the taxation, ecological interests are to be taken into 
account.  While by the burden of a consumer-oriented energy tax an incentive to use fuels in an 
energy-saving manner is given to all participants in transport, commercial air transport is 
excluded therefrom.”  Cf. BT-Drs., 17/3030 at 36 (Ger.).
52  BT-Drs,. 17/10225 at 58 (Ger.). 
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decisive for the climate effects of the air transport tax.53
The extraterritorial area of application of the air transport tax is 
clearly illustrated finally by the tax-rate structure of the tax 
differentiated in accordance with the country of destination.  For long-
haul flights to destinations abroad, in particular, in the USA, the highest 
tax rate of EUR 45.00,54 or, from January 1, 2012, EUR 42.1855
applies.56  In addition, even flights that neither take off nor land in 
Germany are subject to the German air transport tax.  For example, a 
flight from London/Heathrow to the USA is subject to the air transport 
tax if previously, a feeder flight from a German airport precedes it, and 
if, in a complete flight reservation, the final destination is in the USA.57
The tax rates also correspond to the average CO2 emissions per 
passenger quantified by the Federal Ministry of Finance as follows: 
CO2 emissions per passenger58
Avg. distance CO2 per pass. 
Domestic flights 435 km 49.9 kg 
Other flights with air transport tax  = EUR 859 1,380 km 110.3 kg 
Flights with air transport tax = EUR 2560 3,790 km 288.4 kg 
Flights with air transport tax = EUR 4561 8,000 km 543.7 kg 
The above CO2 average emissions per passenger quantified by the 
Federal Ministry of Finance obviously take account of emissions over 
the high seas or over other sovereign territories and prove clearly the 
inclusion of extraterritorial emissions in the taxation.  Such an 
extraterritorial approach blatantly contradicts the fundamental principle 
of sovereignty of the Chicago Convention and the EU/U.S. Open Skies 
Agreement. 
In accordance with the above, the air transport tax breaches the 
principle of sovereignty and therefore the Chicago Convention and the 
EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement. 
53  BT-Drs., 17/10225 at 60 (Ger.). 
54  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$50.23, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
55  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$47.09, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
56 Cf. ATTA, § 11(1), annexes 1, 2 (Ger.). 
57  Introductory Order of the BMF for the customs, III B 6, S 8010/10/10001, Dec. 23, 
2010 and Jan. 11, 2011 at 6 (Ger.). 
58  BT-Drs., 17/10225 at 61, table 33 (Ger.). 
59  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$8.93, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
60  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$27.91, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
61  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$50.23, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. 
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Further, the ATTA has to be qualified as a measure of the Federal 
Republic of Germany which (also) pursues a reduction of greenhouse 
gases caused by aviation on a unilateral basis.  Such unilateral action 
contradicts the co-operation that is necessary to protect the sovereignty 
under international environmental law. 
In summary, the German government is taxing also the conduct of 
an airline that is occurring inside the airspace of the United States or 
other foreign states and infringes therefore on the sovereignty of these 
states.  These emissions and the emissions over the high sea need either 
to be regulated by rules set forth through the Chicago Convention or a 
restriction to the German flag carriers is to be applied.62
V.  The ATTA Is Discriminatory Against Foreign Airlines and Therefore 
Breaches Article 11 of the Chicago Convention 
Article 11 of the Chicago Convention (quoted above) also pursues 
the objective of preventing unequal treatment.  Concretely, it concerns 
the prevention of discrimination because of different nationalities of 
airlines.  The Convention demands expressly that the laws and 
regulations are applied to the aircraft of all contracting states without 
distinction as to nationality.  Logically, it is therefore, according to 
article 11 of the Chicago Convention, prohibited for contracting states 
to differentiate between domestic and foreign airlines by means of rules 
about the departure from their sovereign territories. 
While the air transport tax affects all airlines which operate 
departures from German airports, it applies irrespective of whether a 
German or foreign airline is concerned.  Nevertheless, unequal treatment 
between domestic and foreign airlines arises in two respects.  Details: 
Discrimination arises if different regulations are applied to 
comparable situations or if the same regulation is applied to different 
situations without material justification. 
The situation of domestic and foreign airlines with regard to 
intercontinental flights is quite comparable.  Domestic just as foreign 
airlines offer transport of passengers departing from Germany.  Not only 
is the departure point of the flights identical, but the routes offered are 
usually also the same.  Domestic and foreign airlines are therefore in a 
comparable situation. 
The ATTA, however, discriminates against foreign airlines, which 
do not have their registered offices in the European Union in that airlines 
of different nationalities are affected by obligations with different 
62 Cf. ATTA, § 2(5) in conjunction with Chicago Convention, LuftVZO, art. 17, § 19 
(Ger.).
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administrative efforts and costs, and therefore breaches article 11 of the 
Chicago Convention. 
1.  Obligation to Nominate a Tax Agent 
As outlined in the beginning non-EU carriers are faced with a 
competitive disadvantage, as they have to nominate a tax agent, who is 
jointly and severally liable for the monthly air transport tax together 
with the respective airline.  This is obviously a considerably worse 
position for foreign airlines compared to domestic German and EU 
airlines.
The obligation on foreign airlines to nominate a tax agent 
constitutes a particular obstacle for starting passenger air transport in 
Germany.  According to section 6, subsection 1, sentence 2 of the ATTA, 
the tax agent and the foreign airline are jointly and severally liable for 
the tax.  This means that the tax agent is obliged to bear a considerable 
risk of liability although he has no knowledge of the financial situation 
of the airline.  As a result, tax agents in practice demand high securities 
from airlines.  In conclusion, this structure of the Act obliges the foreign 
airline to avail of a service, which is disproportionately expensive 
although the tax agent provides services, which do not require any 
particular tax expertise.63  In practice, businesses acting as tax agents 
usually demand financially unacceptable security of 1 to 2 months’ tax. 
On the contrary domestic and EU airlines are able to file the tax 
return themselves and do not have to bear the high costs and burdens.  
The fact that neither securing the tax liability nor practicality 
considerations are in favor of the involvement of a tax agent arise in 
addition.  Just as it is handled by domestic and EU airlines, the tax return 
could be filed by the foreign airlines own personnel using translated 
forms, which are basically already provided in English by the customs.  
Domestic and EU airlines and non-EU airlines are thereby treated 
differently although equal treatment is indicated because of the 
comparable basic factual situation. 
This unequal treatment cannot be justified materially.  The 
involvement of a tax agent does not contribute to increasing the 
effectiveness of taxation in the degree, which would be required to 
justify expensive and costly procedures.  This is already shown by the 
wording of section 8, subsection 2, sentence 2 of the ATTA, according 
to which, the license to act as a tax agent for an airline is issued to 
persons with business headquarters in Germany, against whose tax 
reliability there are no reservations and which—if they are obliged 
63  See Hoppe, ATTA, 2012, § 8, marginal number 3 (Ger.). 
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according to the Commercial Code and the Fiscal Code—properly 
conduct commercial accountancy and punctually prepare annual 
financial statements.  The tax agents can usually satisfy these 
requirements without a minimum capital being required in order to 
satisfy the tax liability.  This means that, for example, a new GmbH with 
low capital—if the said conditions are satisfied—can be nominated as 
tax agent.64
Such a low capital company, however, which—according to 
section 8, subsection 3, sentence 2 of the ATTA—is also expressly 
possible, would hardly be able to meet the high (and frequently six-
figure) amounts for the air transport tax in the event of a claim.  The link 
therefore intended by the legislator for the enforcement of the tax 
liability by means of the involvement of a tax agent is financially devoid 
of any effect.  The obligation for foreign airlines to nominate a tax agent 
in the meaning of section 8 of the ATTA, would, in the event of a claim 
against the agent, usually not in the least, serve effective financial 
taxation.
Furthermore, the provision of security in the manner of section 9 of 
the ATTA, which can be deposited with the main customs office would 
be a clearly less drastic method in comparison to the expense-intensive 
and costly search for and involvement of a tax agent.  Additionally such 
a security would be considerably more beneficial for an effective 
taxation than the mediation of a tax agent under the conditions stated.  
The obligation to nominate a tax agent is therefore neither effective nor 
the least burdensome measure by which to achieve the legislative 
purpose.  The compulsion to appoint a tax agent for non-EU airlines, and 
therefore unequal treatment compared to domestic and EU airlines, is 
not justified on any material grounds. 
2.  Graduation of the Tax Rate 
Discrimination also arises from the fact that the tax rate in the 
meaning of section 11 of the ATTA is not graduated, according to 
annexes 1 and 2, consistently in accordance with the geographical 
distance.  In fact, each country is generally classified and taxed 
according to the distance of its largest airport from the largest German 
airport.  The tax rate is thereby higher the further both main airports are 
from each other.  The apportionment is based on three different tax rates.  
The actual flight distance is not considered.  This generalisation leads 
therefore to clearly different tax liabilities in spite of comparable flight 
distances.  A flight from Frankfurt 4,864 miles eastwards to Vladivostok 
64 Hoppe, ATTA, 2012, § 8, marginal number 3 (Ger.). 
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in Russia is taxed at EUR 8.0065 while a flight of 4,025 miles westwards, 
for example to the USA is taxed at EUR 45.00.66  Based on this, U.S. 
airlines suffer considerable discrimination compared to Russian airlines 
conducting flights of the same distance. 
A classification is in principle possible in legislation if it 
corresponds to reality and does not otherwise violate the German 
Constitution and International Law.  However, this does not relieve the 
legislator of the obligation to create materially justified categories and 
to take account of special cases at least in the form of possible 
exceptions.  Otherwise, the same situations are generally and without 
exception treated differently without any material justification.  The 
three grades of tax rates do not correspond to such a classification.  
Discrimination is therefore established. 
A certain degree of classification appears to be unavoidable in view 
of the many routes possible throughout the world.  Although the tax is 
invalid for other reason, graduation on the basis of distance and the 
equalisation of many routes within a category may in principle be 
thinkable as far as the other requirements are met.  However, such a 
classification may not go so far that comparable constellations are 
subject to entirely different treatment and taxation. 
The approach to set the tax rates only on the basis of the largest 
airports of a country exceeds the degree of admissible generalisation and 
classification.  In fact, it must be differentiated and in addition to the 
frequency of flights other environmentally-relevant issues of the 
relevant flights must be taken into account.  These may differ 
considerably.  In particular, the actual route can, in the case of larger 
countries, be significantly longer than the generally applied distance to 
the main airport as illustrated by the above example.  If the legislator, 
as in the present case, decides to assign a certain taxation classification 
to a route (with the associated unfavorable environmental effects), this 
classification may not be different for comparable routes.  Otherwise, 
the classification would be irreconcilable with the legislative objective 
of climate protection purportedly pursued here.  The same flight 
distances would be taxed higher or lower—in spite of actually equal 
environmental effects.  Therefore, a classification is being applied 
which, due to extremely broad classification, does not pursue the 
objective of the legislation and therefore does not correspond with 
reality.
65  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$8.93, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. Since Jan. 1, 2012,
EUR 7.50 equals US$8.37. Cf. ATTA, § 11(1), no. 1 (Ger.). 
66  Tax rate in U.S. dollars: US$50.23, exchange rate of May 26, 2015. Since Jan. 1, 2012,
EUR 42.18 equals US$47.09. Cf. ATTA, § 11(1), no. 3 (Ger.). 
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As a result foreign airlines suffer discrimination by the graduation 
of the tax rates on the basis of countries.  This is, however, precisely 
forbidden by article 11 of the Chicago Convention according to which 
the contracting states must be treated equally without discrimination on 
the basis of nationality and national statutes are to be applied to foreign 
aircraft in a non-discriminatory manner on departure.  A breach of 
article 11 of the Chicago Convention is therefore established. 
VI.  The Air Transport Tax Provides a Unilateral Restriction of Traffic 
A breach of the prohibition of unilateral restriction according to the 
EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement arises.  According to article 3, 
subsection 4 of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement, no contracting party 
is permitted to unilaterally restrict the volume of airline aircraft traffic 
of another contracting party unless required on environmental protection 
grounds and even then uniform conditions in conformity with article 15 
of the Chicago Convention must be applied.  Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention is in any event not complied with.  Nevertheless, an 
inadmissible unilateral restriction of traffic in the meaning of article 3, 
subsection 4 of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement arises. 
This prohibition is a core element of the Agreement and article 3, 
subsection 4 states: 
Each Party shall allow each airline to determine the frequency and 
capacity of the international air transportation it offers based upon 
commercial considerations in the marketplace.  Consistent with this 
right, neither Party shall unilaterally limit the volume of traffic, 
frequency or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types operated 
by the airlines of the other Party, nor shall it require the filing of 
schedules, programs for charter flights, or operational plans by airlines 
of the other Party, except as may be required for customs, technical, 
operational, or environmental (consistent with article 15) reasons under 
uniform conditions consistent with article 15 of the Convention.
Such a restriction arises not only in the case of a direct restriction 
of numbers but also if it is deliberately accepted that the volume of 
passengers of the airlines of a contracting party will fall as a necessary 
consequence of the provision. 
Although the German air transport tax is set up as a tax instrument 
and not as a means to directly restrict the volume of traffic, there are 
strong indications that such a unilateral restriction of the volume of 
traffic—as an expressly intended side effect—follows precisely and in 
fact from the new tax burden.  This indication follows from the fact that 
the ATTA renders flying more expensive.  An expert hearing prior to 
the introduction of the ATTA in the German parliament came to 
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precisely this conclusion.  Experts foretold that the ATTA would lead to 
an annual reduction of passenger numbers of six to seven million.67  The 
latest report of the German Federal Government to the Federal 
Parliament on the effects of the introduction of the ATTA on the airline 
industry proves that the introduction of the air transport tax resulted in 
a restriction of growth in 2011 in the range of approximately 2 million 
passengers.68
According to a study commissioned by the Association of German 
Airlines (BDL), the reduction in passenger numbers in 2011 is said to 
have been up to five million.69
The reduction is not restricted to 2011, the first year after the 
introduction of the air transport tax. In fact, the Federal Government, in 
an update of its report to the German Parliament, confirmed that the 
effect of the air transport tax continues at the level for 2012.70  While 
the extent of the effect of the air transport tax is barely as drastic as 
originally feared, it nevertheless has a considerable negative effect on 
the volume of air transport. 
The restrictive effects of the air transport tax on the volume of 
traffic is not an unintended effect of the act but is confirmed by the 
motives of the legislator.  According to the legislative materials, the 
legislator with the air transport tax pursued the objective of “setting 
incentives for environmentally-friendly behaviour.”71  The legislator is 
of the opinion that the costs of the air transport tax would be added by 
the airlines directly to the fares and therefore passed on directly to the 
passengers.72
It is the intention of the German government that the air transport 
67 See Hearing of the Budget Committee of the Federal Parliament of Oct. 4, 2010, 
protocol no. 17/30 at 43 (Ger.). 
68 See Report of the Federal Government to the Federal Parliament on the Effects of the 
Introduction of the ATTA on the Airline Industry and the Development of Tax Revenue from the 
Air Transport Tax, BT-Drs., 17/10225 at 21, table 12 (Ger.). 
69 See Intraplan, Untersuchung zur verkehrlichen und volkswirtschaftlichen Wirkung der 
Luftverkehrsteuer [Study of the Effects of the Air Transport Tax on Traffic and the Economy], 
Apr. 19, 2012 at 27, “Verkehrsverluste von mindestens 5 Mio. Passagieren” [Passenger Reduction 
of at least 5 Million] (Ger.). 
70 See Bericht der Bundesregierung an den deutschen Bundestag über die Auswirkungen 
der Einführung des Luftverkehrsteuergesetzes auf den Luftverkehrssektor und die Entwicklung 
der Steuereinnahmen aus der Luftverkehrsteuer—Fortschreibung, Aktualisierung und Ergänzung 
[Report of Federal Government about the Impact of the Implementation of the ATTA to the 
Aviation Sector and the Development of the Tax Revenue from the German Air Transport Tax—
Perpetuation, Update and Amendment], BT-Drs., 17/10985 at 41 (Ger.). 
71 See Explanatory Memorandum of the Federal Government, BT-Drs., 17/3030 at 23, 36 
(Ger.).
72 See Explanatory Memorandum of the Federal Government, BT-Drs., 17/3030 at 4 
(Ger.).
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tax should create an incentive for passengers by higher fares to fly less 
frequently and therefore the emissions from aviation would be reduced 
because of fewer numbers of flights.  This, however, means nothing 
more than that the objective of the statute is the reduction in air traffic; 
even if by means of the intermediate step of passing on the costs to the 
passengers.  Unlike in the case of only indirect effects on the volume of 
traffic, a reduction of the numbers of flights is precisely intended.  This 
distinguishes the air transport tax from cases of purely de facto effects 
on the volume of traffic which are neither foreseeable nor planned and 
which would not be covered by article 3, subsection 4 of the EU/U.S. 
Open Skies Agreement.  A restriction of the volume of traffic within the 
meaning of article 3, subsection 4 of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement 
is established. 
The fact that the restriction is unilateral follows from the fact that 
the air transport tax is provided in a statute unilaterally passed by the 
legislator of the Federal Republic of Germany that leads to the described 
effects on the volume of air traffic.  By this unilateral German provision, 
U.S. companies, which are active on the German air transport market as 
competitors, clearly lose numbers of passengers because passengers 
divert to foreign airports, do not travel or do not fly to or from Germany.  
According to expert calculations, in 2011 alone approximately 2 to 
5 million passengers diverted to other means of transport, decided not to 
travel or switched to foreign airports.73
This considerable reduction in passengers is proof of the direct 
effects of the air transport tax on the volume of traffic.  Such an active 
restriction by a national statute is, however, precisely forbidden by 
article 3, subsection 4 of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement.  It cannot 
be justified by political-environmental objectives either because, even 
in that case, the provisions of article 15 of the Chicago Convention must 
be complied with.  This is not, however as has been shown, the case.  It 
is not required to establish a breach of article 3, subsection 4 of the EU/
U.S. Open Skies Agreement that merely individual airlines are 
prejudiced.  What is decisive is that one of the contracting parties—here 
the Federal Republic of Germany—restricts by a national statue the 
volume of traffic and that this restriction is unfavourable for the aircraft 
used by the other contracting party.  Such a negative effect on American 
airlines is established by the proven reduction in passenger numbers. 
A breach of the prohibition of unilateral restriction according to 
article 3, subsection 4 of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement therefore 
73  BT-Drs. 17/10225 at 21; Intraplan, Untersuchung zur verkehrlichen und 
volkswirtschaftlichen Wirkung der Luftverkehrsteuer [Study of the Effects of the Air Transport 
Tax on Traffic and the Economy], Apr. 19, 2012 at 33 (Ger.). 
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exists.
VII.  The Air Transport Tax Breaches the Fair and Equal Competition 
Conditions by Discriminating Against Foreign Airlines 
The introduction of the air transport tax also leads to a distortion of 
the competitive conditions and therefore breaches article 2 of the EU/
U.S. Open Skies Agreement which states, “[e]ach Party shall allow a 
fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of both Parties to compete in 
providing the international air transportation governed by this 
Agreement.” 
This principle of fair and equal competition is undermined by the 
ATTA deliberately.  The ATTA provides specific obligations 
exclusively for foreign airlines, which can only be satisfied by them at 
high costs. 
Section 8 together with section 7, subsection 2, sentence 3, together 
with section 6, subsection 1 of the ATTA, demands the nomination of a 
tax agent based in Germany who bears joint and several liability together 
with the airline and for whom the foreign airline must provide the 
necessary documents.  This involves considerable costs for the foreign 
airlines although the tax assessment can, due to the division into three 
distance classes, be prepared comparatively simple.  The ATTA 
discriminates by these obligations, which apply exclusively to foreign 
airlines not having their registered offices in Germany. 
The competitive conditions for foreign airlines are therefore 
precisely not comparable with those for German airlines.  In fact, cost-
intensive additional obligations are imposed on foreign airlines.  Higher 
costs for the conduct of flights from Germany lead, to the situation that 
foreign airlines have worse starting conditions.  Since the costs for 
engaging the tax agent must usually be passed on to the fares they face 
a competitive disadvantage. 
Precisely in the aviation sector, however, in which smaller price 
differences rapidly become decisive factors for customers when seeking 
the best airline, such higher costs can have negative effects on 
competition.  Because of uncomplicated online reservations, it is 
possible to change rapidly to another airline, which can offer lower fares 
than the foreign airline because of the absence of additional costs.  Since 
for most passengers, the price is also often the sole and most noticeable 
comparison criterion, a price increase on the part of foreign airlines is a 
disadvantage in attracting passengers.  The additional obligations 
therefore have negative effects on the competitiveness of foreign airlines 
compared to domestic airlines. 
The competition is not fair and equal as demanded by article 2 of 
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the Open Skies Agreement.  Foreign airlines are discriminated against.  
Clear competitive disadvantages for foreign airlines arise.  Thus, the 
requirement of article 2 of the Open Skies Agreement for fair and equal 
competitive conditions is not satisfied.  A breach of article 2 of the Open 
Skies Agreement therefore arises. 
VIII.  The Air Transport Tax Is De Facto a Customs Duty on Fuel Used in 
International Air Transport 
The air transport tax furthermore breaches article 24 of the Chicago 
Convention and article 11, subsection 2(c) of the Open Skies 
Agreement.74  The air transport tax must be classified as a forbidden “de 
facto similar national charge” within the meaning of article 24(a), 
sentence 2 of the Chicago Convention and article 11, subsection 2(c) of 
the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement on fuel.  Details: 
1.  Prohibition on Taxing Aircraft Fuel 
The air transport tax must be classified as a “similar national 
charge” and is therefore subject to the regime of article 24(a), sentence 2 
of the Chicago Convention.  Contrary to the somewhat unclear wording, 
article 24(a), sentence 2 of the Chicago Convention forbids not only the 
taxation of fuel which is on board both at the time of arrival and also on 
departure from the starting territory (transit fuel) but also according to 
the decision of the council of the ICAO forbids the taxation of aircraft 
fuel used during the time in the territory of the relevant state and taken 
on board in the sovereign territory of the relevant state.75
2.  The Air Transport Tax Is De Facto a Tax on Fuel 
The air transport tax must be classified as a tax on fuel.  This 
classification is justified firstly by an analysis of the legislative material 
on which the ATTA is based since, according thereto, the legislator in 
specifying the area of application as commercial aviation and not 
74  Article 24(a), sentence 2 of the Chicago Convention reads as follows: 
“Fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores on board an aircraft of 
a contracting State, on arrival in the territory of another contracting State and retained on board 
on leaving the territory of that State shall be exempt from customs duty, inspection fees or similar 
national or local duties and charges.” 
Similarly, article 11(2)(c) of the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement provides for tax exemption for: 
“Fuel, lubricants and consumable technical supplies introduced into or supplied in the territory 
of a Party for use in an aircraft of an airline of the other Party engaged in international air 
transportation, even when these supplies are to be used on a part of the journey performed over 
the territory of the Party in which they are taken on board.” 
75 Cf. ICAOs Policies on Taxation in the Field of International Air Transport, doc. 8632, 
Resolution 1(a). 
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 71 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
37333-fiu_10-2 Sheet No. 71 Side A      01/11/2016   08:19:25
C M
Y K
08 - ERLING_FINAL_1.4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/4/16 6:30 PM
2015] The German Air Transport Tax 489 
including private flying, was crucially guided by the consideration that 
private flying is already subject to taxation on fuel. 
For example, the legislative reasoning refers to the fact that the 
energy tax based on consumption charged for all other means of 
transport creates an incentive to save fuel.76  Commercial aviation, 
however, is exempt therefrom due to European law and international 
conventions, for example the Energy Tax Directive 2003/96.  It also 
refers to the fact that the introduction of a kerosene tax at international 
level within a short period appears to be unrealistic. 
It is, thereby, clear that the legislator with the introduction of the 
air transport tax intended to apply a tax where none exists.  Adding this 
tax allegedly provides the necessary incentive for commercial operators 
to deal with fuel in an energy-saving and therefore environmentally-
friendly manner.  In particular, the reference to the fact that at 
international level, at the time the ATTA was passed, it was the opinion 
of the German legislator that no agreement on a kerosene tax could be 
expected within a short time is revealing in this respect.  This reference 
makes it clear that the German legislator believed there was no progress 
internationally and decided—in an illegal manner—to unilaterally set 
incentives for environmentally-friendly conduct.  The legislator thereby 
revealed that the air transport tax by its nature is classified as a tax on 
fuel.
The division into distance classes supports this result because the 
legislator thereby graded the tax rates and provided higher tax rates for 
more distant countries.77  Greater distance correlates directly with higher 
kerosene consumption. 
The classification of the air transport tax as a de facto taxation on 
fuel is also clearly illustrated by a statement of the Federal Minister of 
Finance, Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble.  In a speech before the German 
parliament on September 14, 2010, he described the air transport tax as 
a substitute for fuel tax, which could not be introduced at national level 
because of international and European law provisions.78
76  BT-Drs., 17/3030 at 36 (Ger.).  
77 Cf. ATTA, § 11(1) (Ger.).
78  Literally, the Federal Minister of Finance said: “The abolition of the exemption of air 
traffic to pay a tax on mineral oil—in contrast to rail and road traffic—would find a broad 
acceptance within the general public and the parliament.  However, we cannot abolish this 
exemption because of international and European law restrictions.  One can regret this 
consequence, but it is a fact.  Thus, we want to introduce an air transport tax instead of it.  This 
is a substitute for the taxation of kerosene that cannot be introduced on national level.  This is 
subsidy reduction.  I believe this measure is well dosed, balanced and it can be justified on good 
grounds.” Cf. (Translated) speech of Dr. Wolfgang Schäuble, dated Sept. 14, 2010, before the 
German Parliament, minute of plenary proceedings, no. 17/57 at 5910 (Ger.). 
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The air transport tax, therefore, breaches article 24 of the Chicago 
Convention and article 11, subsection 2(c) of the EU/U.S. Open Skies 
Agreement. 
C. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MULTIPLE TREATY OVERRIDE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Given the multiple unilateral breaches of international treaties by 
subsequent national tax legislation—so called treaty overriding—the crucial 
question is: What does this mean for the application of the ATTA on the 
national level?79
The answer to this question is given in section 2, subsection 1 of 
the Fiscal Code. According to this provision, international law treaties 
take precedence over national tax law. 
Section 2, subsection 1 of the Fiscal Code, headed “Primacy of 
International Agreements” provides thereon: 
Agreements on taxation concluded with other countries within the 
meaning of article 59, subsection 2, sentence 1 of the Constitution shall 
take precedence over tax legislation insofar as they have become 
directly applicable domestic law.80
The requirements for the precedence of international law 
agreements according to section 2, subsection 1 of the Fiscal Code are 
complied with in the constellation at hand as the relevant treaties have 
been implemented in national law and relate to taxation. Notably, 
section 2, subsection 1 of the Fiscal Code covers only agreements in the 
meaning of article 59, subsection 2, sentence 1 of the Constitution, 
which have become domestic law and are directly applicable.  The 
domestic law application requires an incorporating sovereign act in the 
form of an implementation act of the legislator.81  The Chicago 
Convention was implemented into directly applicable domestic law by 
the Federal Act of April 7, 1956,82 and the TFCN between the Federal 
79  The fact that the breach of existing internationally-binding law in the absence of a 
formal reservation in the ATTA (“notwithstanding”-clause) is to be considered not as an “open” 
but as a “latent” treaty overriding does not change this classification as a treaty override. In the 
opinion of the German Federal Fiscal Court, a latent treaty overriding is, because of its content 
and effect, to be classified as such.  BFH, referral decision of Dec. 11, 2013–IR 4/13, Juris 
marginal number 38 with further references. 
80  In the explanatory memorandum of 1975, the legislator states as follows: “The newly 
introduced section 2 clarifies that international law agreements, insofar as they have become 
domestic law, have precedence over domestic tax legislation and therefore cannot be amended 
alone by later domestic legislation.”  See BT-Drs., 7/42/92 at 15 (Ger.). 
81 See Musil in Hübschmann, Hepp, and Spitaler, AO/FGO, June 2013, § 2 AO marginal 
number 153 (Ger.). 
82  BGBL. II at 411 (Ger.). 
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Republic of Germany and the United States of America by act of May 
7, 1956.83  Finally, the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement has been 
implemented just recently in national law.84
The Chicago Convention, EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement, and also 
the TFCN are agreements that relate to taxation since agreements on 
taxation are international treaties about the admissibility or the extent of 
tax intervention.  The range of international agreements covered is 
wide.85  This includes all agreements the subject matter of which effects 
questions of taxation or which at least regulate economic circumstances 
linked to taxation situations and their regulation has a direct influence 
on the distribution of the tax burden.  In particular, all agreements are 
covered that are directed to restrict the legislator’s taxation freedom.86
According to the legal consequence provided in section 2, 
subsection 1 of the Fiscal Code, international agreements which have 
become directly applicable in domestic law have precedence over 
national tax legislation.87  That means that, because of the precedence 
ordered by section 2, subsection 1 of the Fiscal Code, the TFCN, the 
Chicago Convention, and the EU/U.S. Open Skies Agreement, as 
international agreements incorporated at the level of national law, have 
precedence over the ATTA.  This also involves on the part of the 
subordinated national ATTA, yielding to the extent that the international 
treaties with precedence supersede it.  This has the result that the ATTA, 
(in any event) with regard to the order provided in section 4, together 
with section 6, subsection 1 of the ATTA to pay the Air Transport Tax 
on departure, is not applicable.  The provision with priority is to be 
applied while the subordinate provision remains inapplicable on an 
individual basis without losing its validity (precedence of validity).88
This precedence corresponds, with regard to its effect, to the 
primacy of Community Law,89 and the priority application of (general) 
provisions of international law according to article 25, sentence 2 of the 
83  BGBL. II at 487 (Ger.). 
84  BGBL. II at 27 (Ger.). 
85 See Pahlke in Koenig and Pahlke, AO, § 2, marginal number 2 (2d ed., 2009) (Ger.). 
86 See Musil in Hübschmann, Hepp and Spitaler, AO/FGO, June 2013, § 2 AO, marginal 
number 36. 
87 See Gersch, in Klein, AO, § 2, marginal number 3 (12th ed., 2014) (Ger.). 
88 See Heckmann, Geltungskraft und Geltungsverlust von Rechtsnormen, 1997 at 333.  
With regard to the legal consequences of the precedence of application Heintschel von Heinegg 
in Epping and Hillgruber, Beck’scher Online-Kommentar GG, status, Sept. 1, 2014, art. 25, 
marginal number 28 (Ger.). 
89 See ECJ, judgment of Feb. 7, 1991, RS C-184/89, collection 1991, I-297 (321). BVerfG, 
judgment of Jan. 28, 1992, 1 BvR 1025/82, BVerfGE 85, 191, 204; BFH, decision of Mar. 21, 
1995, XI R 33/94, Juris marginal number 15; Fiscal Court Munich, judgment of Dec. 13, 2010, 7 
K 2662/09, Juris marginal number 34; Jarass, NJW 1990, 2420, 2421 (Ger.). 
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Constitution.90  Therefore, the subordinate ATTA in the absence of a 
binding effect cannot be an appropriate legal basis for the taxation if 
challenged by airlines.  As a consequence of the yielding of the 
conflicting national provision, the contested administrative acts and 
other implementing acts are to be rescinded.91
D. SUMMARY
On the basis of the above, the ATTA breaches elementary provisions of 
international (air transport) law.  The imposition of the Air Transport Tax on 
foreign airlines is, therefore, unlawful.  Due to the precedence of international 
law agreements over the ATTA as national law according to section 2, 
subsection 1 of the Fiscal Code, the ATTA cannot be an adequate legal basis 
for the air transport tax. 
90  See Herdegen in Maunz and Dürig, GG, Mar. 2014, art. 25, marginal number 43; 
Steinberger in Isensee and Kirchhof, Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. VII, § 173, marginal 
number 54 (3d ed., 2007); even in favor of an application by analogy of art. 25, sentence 2, 
Constitution to the TFCN as incorporated international treaty law Higher Administrative Court 
of Munich, judgment of July 28, 2006, 9 BV 05.1863, Juris marginal number 72 (Ger.). 
91 See Herdegen in Maunz and Dürig, GG, Mar. 2014, art. 25, marginal number 43; Streinz 
in Sachs, GG, art. 25, marginal number 93 (6th ed., 2011). 
